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discuss a number of remaining issues that are out-
side of these options and cost estimates.1
It is important at the outset to note that the
Medicaid program has provided great benefits to
low-income Americans. The program provides
insurance coverage to over 40 million Americans on
a given day and to some 50+ million at any point
during the year. Most of these would not have had
coverage without Medicaid. As a result, the number
of uninsured would have been much higher than the
45 million reported for 2005. Medicaid has been a
major source of health care coverage for low-income
pregnant women and children, and for the disabled.
The program pays for about half of all births in the
United States. It helps low-income elderly and
disabled people pay for Medicare premiums and
cost sharing. It is a major source of support for
safety net hospitals and clinics. Finally, it is the
backbone for the nation’s long-term care system.
The proposals adopted by the Bush administra-
tion and the Congress in recent years are not likely
R
eforming the Medicaid program has
been a major focus of the Bush admin-
istration and the Congress. The Deficit
Reduction Act has already put forth
some major changes to Medicaid, and the Bush
administration has also approved several Section
1115 waivers that significantly change the program.
Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael
Leavitt also established a commission to consider
fundamental reforms.
The primary diagnosis of the problem with
Medicaid is the program’s high and rising costs.
Thus, most of the recent reform initiatives attempt
to deal with containing program spending. In this
paper, we argue that these recent policy initiatives
(increased cost sharing, flexibility in benefit/design,
and premium assistance) will not have significant
effects on program spending and are not real reform.
But while we do not believe that these initiatives
will accomplish much, we do believe Medicaid
does need reform for several reasons. We discuss
these reasons and then present four alternative
options as well, as cost estimates, for each. We then
Recent administration proposals to address the rising cost of Medicaid will do little to contain costs
or truly reform the program. The primary issues are the large differences among state Medicaid
programs in coverage and benefits and the programs high and rising costs. In this paper, we
describe and develop several options for Medicaid reform that would expand coverage, provide
fiscal relief to states, shift responsibility for some or all of the cost of dual eligibles to the federal
government, and eliminate or restructure the disproportionate share programs. A number of other
issues are addressed, including Medicaid cost containment and the federal matching rate structure.
(JEL I10, I18)
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problem with Medicaid is often identified as one
of moral hazard.2 People face low costs at the point
of service thus tend to overuse services. In addition,
the program is accused of having a “Cadillac” bene-
fit package—benefits far exceed those available to
low-income working Americans.3 The administra-
tion and Congress’s solution to these problems is
to provide states with greater flexibility to impose
more cost sharing and to limit benefit packages.
These policies may reduce overall use of program
services but could also do great harm by reducing
use of services that are vitally needed by low-
income populations. The recent proposals also
ignore the fact that Medicaid in essence solves
the rationing problem that cost sharing is designed
to serve by keeping provider payment rates low,
reducing access to providers, and thereby reducing
utilization.
The real reason for spending growth in
Medicaid is primarily due to two things: (i) enroll-
ment growth that can be traced to the erosion of
employer-sponsored insurance, particularly for
low-wage workers, and increases in income
inequality—both have meant that more people
qualify for Medicaid under existing eligibility
standards; and (ii) an increase in the incidence
and recognition of disability resulting in a consis-
tent (approximately) 3 percent increase in the num-
ber of disabled enrollees. Finally, the health care
inflation that has plagued the entire health care
system also affects Medicaid (Holahan and Ghosh,
2005, and Holahan and Cohen, 2006).
Recent research (Hadley and Holahan, 2003/
2004) has shown that, on a risk-adjusted basis,
Medicaid costs are not higher than for low-income
people with private insurance (see Figure 1):
Statistical studies that control for disability and
the presence of chronic illness show that private
coverage for the same population would be more
costly. Spending would increase from $719 to
$795 for children and from $3,145 to $4,410 for
adults (2001 dollars) if people on Medicaid were
given private coverage, not including the likely
increase in administrative costs. Furthermore,
Medicaid costs have not been growing faster than
private insurance (see Figure 2).
But while recent diagnoses and solutions do
seem misguided, we do believe that Medicaid does
need reform. We highlight four reasons.
First, Medicaid costs are a growing burden for
states. Although Medicaid costs per enrollee are
not high in comparison with costs in the private
market, Medicaid enrollment growth coupled with
medical care inflation is clearly forcing health care
spending to increase faster than the rate of growth
in state revenues.
Second, the variation among states in coverage
and provider payment rates is extremely large and
difficult to accept, given the large national stake
in financing the program, i.e., at least half of the
money in each state is federal dollars. Thus, we
believe how these funds are used is a national con-
cern and the variation that we observe is inconsis-
tent with the best interest of the nation (Holahan,
2003, and Spillman, 2000).
Third, a related issue is that eligibility stan-
dards are extremely complicated, difficult to
understand, and restrictive—that is, they exclude
populations, including childless adults, that have
very low incomes and are in need of better access
to health care.
Finally, the creative financing arrangements
that states have used over the last 15 years, while
typically legal, have also led to a considerable
amount of mistrust between the federal and state
governments (Coughlin and Zuckerman, 2003, and
Rousseau and Schneider, 2004). They have led to
the transfer of funds to state governments with little
or no state matching payments, a practice that is
clearly inconsistent with the fundamental nature
of the program.
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS
We propose four options that will address these
problems. All have somewhat different objectives.
All are designed to cost about the same amount to
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2 Although not specific to Medicaid, the general case for overuse as a
concern is set forth in Council of Economic Advisors (2006) and
Cannon (2005).
3 References by political leaders to Medicaid as a Cadillac program
are legion. For example, see the radio address by Tennessee Governor
Phil Bredesen, June 11, 2005;
http://democraticgovernors.org/news/280 (accessed February 9, 2007).Holahan and Weil











Per Capita Expenditures (2001 $)
Figure 1
Medicaid Costs Are Not Higher Than Private Insurance on a Risk-Adjusted Basis
NOTE: All differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. “Adults” include ages 19 to 64. “Children” include ages 0 to 18.
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Medicaid Costs Are Not Growing Faster Than Private Acute Care Services, 2000-05 (percent)
SOURCE: Kaiser/HRET Survey of Employer Sponsored Health Benefits, 1999-2006; and Ginsburg et al. (2006).the federal government and to provide about the
same savings to states. They each will increase
costs to the federal government more than they
provide savings to the states. The net additional
cost is overwhelmingly due to the coverage expan-
sions that are a part of each option. The key com-
ponents of reform are as follows:
1. States would be required to increase cover-
age to certain income levels for parents and
childless adults and be given the option to
offer coverage to individuals at higher income
levels. This would establish a uniform base
of coverage across states and reduce the num-
ber of uninsured. It would provide a base to
build upon with other policies such as tax
credits or income-related subsidies as, for
example, has occurred in Massachusetts.
2. Responsibility for some services or popula-
tions would shift wholly to the federal gov-
ernment and some would shift wholly back
to the states. In general, this shifting would
involve some or all of the care for “dual eli-
gibles”—those eligible for both Medicare and
Medicaid—who would become the respon-
sibility of the federal government. This would
provide fiscal relief to states and give the
federal government a central role in manag-
ing these high-cost cases. With some care
shifted back to states, system efficiency
would potentially improve, which would
offset for the federal government the costs
of their new responsibilities.
3. Federal matching rates for selected popula-
tions or services would be increased, e.g.,
“adults,” “acute care,” or long-term care,
depending on the option. This would pro-
vide fiscal relief to states and an incentive
to expand coverage—by lowering the costs
to do so. Also, this would allow states to
avoid cutbacks in times of fiscal stress
because the benefits from contractions
would be less.
4. The Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH)
program would be ended or reformed to
severely curtail the practices of increasing
federal matching payments with no real
state contribution. In the paper, we focus on
DSH payments, but the intent is to include
all similar practices.
Option I
The primary focus of this option is on expand-
ing coverage for acute care services. It would pro-
vide a 30 percent enhanced match to cover all adults
with incomes of up to 150 percent of the federal
poverty level (FPL) and allow states to use the
enhanced match to provide coverage to individu-
als at higher income levels. The State Children’s
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) would end,
but Medicaid would be altered to have somewhat
similar characteristics. There would be no enroll-
ment caps, but there would be premiums and cost
sharing for children of families with higher incomes,
as in the current SCHIP program. Medicare premi-
ums and cost sharing for acute care services for
dual eligibles would become the responsibility of
the federal government. The current “clawback”
payments would be retained. (These are payments
a state makes to the federal government for the
state’s estimated share of drug payments they would
have had to pay had there been no Medicare drug
benefit.) This option would increase federal match-
ing payments on acute care services by 30 percent.
This would affect acute care services used by adults,
children, and disabled populations who are not
dual eligible. The matching rates for long-term care
would be unchanged. The DSH program would be
eliminated because there would be less of a need
for this residual safety net as coverage expands,
and any additional remaining needs would become
a state responsibility.
Option II
Option II also places a strong emphasis on
coverage expansion and fiscal relief for states, but
extends the financial help to spending for long-
term care. Option II would mandate that coverage
be extended to all adults to 150 percent FPL and
provide a 15 percent enhanced match to do so.
Federal matching payments for all services, both
acute care and long-term care, would be increased
by 15 percent; SCHIP would stay a separate pro-
gram. Federal matching payments for Medicaid
and SCHIP would be 15 percent above the current
Holahan and Weil
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between SCHIP and Medicaid, where children of
families with higher incomes receive higher federal
payments through SCHIP. It would federalize acute
care services for dual eligibles, including eliminat-
ing the clawback payment now made by states.
Option II would also eliminate DSH for the reasons
given above.
Option III
Option III would focus more on long-term care
because it assumes that the primary policy concern
is the impact of an aging population on states.
Option III would mandate coverage of all adults,
but only to 100 percent FPL. There would be no
change in current matching rates for acute care
services. SCHIP would be unchanged and maintain
the current higher federal matching payments. It
would federalize acute care services for dual eligi-
bles and eliminate the drug clawback. The major
focus here would be an increase of 30 percent in
federal matching payments for services for long-
term care. This option would also restructure DSH.
Because there is less of a coverage expansion than
in other options, DSH payments would be main-
tained but redistributed so that the states would
get the same amount per low-income person. This
would deal with the current problem of poor dis-
tribution of funds: 10 states now get 71 percent of
DSH payments, 5 states get more than $1,000 per
uninsured person and 16 states get less than $100
per uninsured person.
Option IV
Option IV would be the largest change in current
policy. It would mandate coverage of all adults to
100 percent FPL but there would be no change in
matching rates. SCHIP would be unchanged and
keep the current 30 percent matching rate. The
major focus would be to shift all costs of dual eli-
gibles to the federal government, including costs
for long-term care; responsibility for costs for long-
term care for non-dual eligibles would shift back
to the states. This option would also eliminate the
prescription drug clawback payment. Finally, DSH
payments would be restructured as described in
Option III.
Policy Changes Common to All Options
There are certain provisions that are common
to all options. First, prescription drugs coverage
would become a mandatory benefit. All states cur-
rently provide prescription drugs coverage, so this
is not, in practice, much of a change. Second, there
would be increased flexibility in the use of cost
sharing above 150 percent FPL but not below. Third,
there would be increased flexibility on mandatory
benefits for adults but little or no change in benefits
for children or the disabled. For example, benefits
through the current Early Periodic Screening,
Diagnosis, and Treatment Program would remain.
Finally, there would be caps on enrollments in the
new optional programs (i.e., programs beyond
those mandated).
COVERAGE EXPANSIONS
We estimate the impact of coverage expansion
using a detailed spreadsheet model that begins with
the baseline of current coverage. The U.S. popula-
tion is organized by children, parents, and childless
adults; by income; by current insurance arrange-
ments; and by four geographic regions. We model
current eligibility for public programs in great detail
for each state. We then apply “take-up rates” (the
probability of individuals “taking up” the newly
available coverage) to each group based on the
current research evidence (Selden, Banthin, and
Cohen, 1998; Dubay, Haley, and Kenney, 2002a;
Dubay, Holahan, and Cook, 2007; and Davidoff,
Yemane, and Adams, 2005). We also rely on the
extensive literature on the crowding out of private
coverage by public expansions (Blumberg, Dubay,
and Norton, 2000; Cutler and Gruber, 1996; Dubay,
1999; and Lo Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004). We
base our estimates of Medicaid spending on the
Medicaid Management Information System for
2002, adjusting forward for inflation using several
different sources to obtain 2007 estimates.4 Because
those persons likely to come into the program
through a coverage expansion are likely to be
healthier than those in existing programs, we
Holahan and Weil
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4 Congressional Budget Office, March 2006 baseline.make an adjustment for the better health status of
those new enrollees. We also assume a reduced
benefit package for adults and make a downward
adjustment (7.5 percent) to the cost of care for that
population.
Table 1 shows the effect of the coverage expan-
sions on Medicaid enrollment. An expansion to
100 percent FPL would increase Medicaid rolls by
7.1 million and to 150 percent FPL by 11.1 million.
The majority of these new enrollees would be child-
less adults. The number of uninsured would fall
by 5.2 million with an expansion to 100 percent FPL
and by 7.8 million with an expansion to 150 per-
cent FPL. The cost to the federal government would
be $24.1 billion and $38.1 billion, respectively.
As shown in Table 2, each of the four options
would increase federal spending by between $41.1
and $48.5 billion. At the same time, states would
save between $15.1 billion and $22.6 billion. The
net additional cost to the health care system would
be between $25.8 billion and $29.7 billion. Option
IV has the largest increase in federal spending and
the greatest savings to states. Option I has the great-
est net increase in cost to government as a whole.
The biggest impact on costs is the coverage
expansion. For example, in Option I, the expansion
to 150 percent FPL with a 30 percent enhanced
match would increase costs to the federal govern-
ment by $28.9 billion and to states by $9.2 billion
(see Table 1). The changes in federal matching
payments would shift a substantial amount of
money to the federal government and save states a
considerable amount as well.
After expanded coverage, the next biggest
impact on cost would come from changes in poli-
cies affecting dual eligibles. The cost of having the
federal government pick up Medicare premiums
and cost sharing for acute care services and retain-
ing the current policy on the drug clawback would
increase federal costs by $7.5 billion and reduce
state spending by the same amount. Federalizing
acute care for dual eligibles but eliminating the
clawback would increase the federal costs by $14.1
billion and save states the same amount. Shifting
all of the costs of dual eligibles to the federal gov-
Holahan and Weil
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Table 1
Estimated Cost of Expanding Coverage to 100 Percent and 150 Percent FPL
100 percent FPL 150 percent FPL













Change in Spending (2006 $ billions)
Option Federal State Net
I 44.8 –15.1 29.7
II 44.6 –15.6 29.0
III 41.1 –15.3 25.8
IV 48.5 –22.6 25.9ernment would shift $47.7 billion from the states
to the federal government.
These policies would have different effects
across regions. The coverage expansions would
have the biggest impacts on the south because
coverage levels are currently lower there. The
increases in federal matching rates would help the
northeast the most because Medicaid programs in
that region tend to have broader coverage and richer
benefits than elsewhere in the country. Federalizing
spending for dual eligibles also benefits the north-
east the most, again because of broad coverage and
richer benefits, particularly in long-term care. Cuts
in DSH payments would hurt the northeast and the
south the most. DSH restructuring would have an
adverse effect on the northeast but would benefit
all other regions, although not all states within
those regions.
Table 3 shows these effects. For the northeast,
Option IV offers the greatest increase in federal
spending and greatest savings to the states. Because
the northeast spends proportionately more on dual
eligibles than other regions, it would benefit the
most from shifting dual eligibles to the federal
government. In contrast, the south is better off
under Option I because of the increase in federal
payments it would receive for broad coverage
expansion. However, it would gain less from the
increased matching rates because it spends less
on those services currently.
OTHER ISSUES
There are a number of other issues that are
important for Medicaid reform.
Cost Containment
Cost containment efforts historically have
relied on controls over provider payment rates
and increased use of managed care. Recent initia-
tives are attempting to introduce more cost sharing
and benefit flexibility. As noted, these initiatives
are likely to have relatively small effects. Rather,
we believe that cost containment should be focused
on the beneficiaries with the highest cost. At pres-
ent, 7.5 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries account
for two-thirds of Medicaid spending (Sommers and
Cohen, 2006). There is a need for a large federal
investment in both Medicaid and Medicare case
management and care-coordination programs
(Lieberman et al., 2003; and Thorpe and Howard,
2006). There is a need for changes in payment
approaches to provide incentives for physicians
to coordinate and manage the care of patients
with multiple chronic conditions and to expand
Medicaid managed care (with beneficiary protec-
tions) to more of the disabled (Anderson, 2005;
Berenson and Horvath, 2003; Wagner, Austin, and
Von Korff, 1996; and Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, 2006, Chap. 2). This is new territory
to be sure, but clearly this is where the money is
and where the focus of cost containment for spend-
Holahan and Weil
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Table 3
Impacts of Proposed Medicaid Reform Options by Region, 2006
Northeast Midwest South West
Option Federal State Federal State Federal State Federal State
I 21.1 –16.8 28.4 –12.6 35.8 –11.7 34.0 –8.8
II 22.5 –18.0 29.5 –14.7 33.7 –6.6 35.9 –12.8
III 23.4 –19.8 28.4 –13.9 29.4 –7.3 29.3 –7.9
IV 33.8 –30.7 34.8 –22.3 27.1 –3.3 36.3 –16.7
NOTE: Spending data were adjusted to 2006 using the CMS-64 and Congressional Budget Office projections (March 2006 baseline).
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on population information from the March 2005 Current Population Survey and spending data
from the 2002 Medicaid Management Information System.ing on particularly low-income populations should
be focused.
Provider Payment Rates
We believe the provider payment rates should
be improved. This would improve the image of
the program among providers as well as increase
physician participation rates. Setting minimum
standards and rates could become the responsibility
of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission.
Medicaid payment rates could gradually be
increased over time, i.e., to a minimum of 90 per-
cent of Medicare rates.
“Creative” Financing
Creative financing, including all practices that
bring in federal monies without real state or local
matching rates, should be eliminated. We have
focused on DSH in the discussion above, but there
are a number of other similar arrangements such
as upper payment limit programs, school-based
clinic programs, and targeted case management
(Allen, 2005; and Coughlin, Bruen, and King, 2004).
These programs added at least $13 billion to federal
outlays in 2005 with unknown state matching
contributions. The federal government should
enforce current rules designed to reduce or elimi-
nate all such practices (Schwartz et al., 2006).
Medicaid Participation
There should be an effort to increase partici-
pation rates in Medicaid. In general, participation
rates of those eligible for Medicaid are slightly
above 50 percent. Some states have much higher
participation rates (Dubay, Haley, and Kenney,
2002b). There should be a combination of federal
promotion and advertising as well as federal stan-
dards for outreach, income verification, and recer-
tification. Higher participation rates would increase
Medicaid enrollment and spending but also lower
the number of uninsured, reducing the need for
many government programs that support safety
net providers.
Eligibility for Long-Term Care
Long-term care has generally not been dis-
cussed in the options presented above. Two areas,
however, are important. While it is important to
deter deceptive practices (e.g., transferring assets
to become eligible for Medicaid), deterrence is not
likely to result in large budgetary savings (O’Brien,
2005). However, under the current requirements,
people must “spend down” (i.e., spend large
amounts of money) before becoming eligible for
Medicaid. Thus, there is a need to permit people
to retain somewhat higher levels of assets and
income. The second issue is the extreme uneven-
ness in the coverage of home and community-based
services for impaired elderly and disabled people.
Efforts should be made to permit states to expand
coverage of home and community-based services
in general and to people with higher income levels.
Change the Federal Matching Fund
Formula
The federal matching formula should be
reformed (Miller and Schneider, 2004). The current
system now recognizes differences in incomes. It
needs to be restructured to recognize differences
in income distribution as well. For example, two
states with the same income level could have very
different proportions of their population in poverty
and thus different needs for federal assistance.
Centering the matching rate on income per person
in poverty would end up shifting dollars to states
with a more skewed distribution of income. If some
of the other changes in matching rates and shifts
in responsibility to the federal government that
have been discussed in this paper were adopted,
then all states would come out as winners, but
some more than others. There is a need to increase
matching rates with rising unemployment on a
timely basis.
CONCLUSIONS
We have identified the following problems with
Medicaid: large interstate variation in coverage,
costs that are increasingly a burden to states, com-
plex eligibility rules, and creative state financing.
To address these problems, we propose to expand
and provide a more uniform base of coverage and
reduce the number of uninsured. These uniform
standards would be easier for the states and federal
Holahan and Weil
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designed to reduce the number of uninsured
Americans. We would also shift more of the finan-
cial responsibility for Medicaid to the federal
government and provide fiscal relief to states. We
would give the federal government greater respon-
sibility for managing the care of high-cost patients,
which would also provide a strong incentive for the
federal government to invest in learning how to
manage these high-cost cases. Finally, our proposals
would severely restrain the financial manipula-
tions that are now too great a part of the Medicaid
program.
The nation is now undertaking a new discussion
over universal coverage. We believe Medicaid
reform has to be part of that discussion.
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